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Introduction
It is the standard view in the United States that U.S. antitrust law does not reach acts of exploitation by a monopolist. The focus in monopolization cases is on exclusionary conduct-conduct that excludes competitors on some basis other than efficiency and thereby allows a firm either to gain or to maintain monopoly. Courts do not pay attention to a monopolist's conduct that is just unfair to its rivals, or even to conduct that is flat-out deceptive. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is concerned with harm to competition, the courts remind us, not harm to competitors.
1 Indeed, and perhaps surprisingly, courts in Section 2 cases are not even concerned with higher prices in themselves-"rent extraction." As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in Rambus (a case to which we will return), "Even if deception raises the price secured by a seller, . . . it is beyond the antitrust laws' reach." includes "dealing at unjust prices" and dealing with another party on terms that "restrict unjustly" the other party's business (Arts. 19, 2(9) ).
Without denying this substantial divergence in general between the U.S. and the rest of the world, it turns out that there may be fewer differences between the U.S. and other jurisdictions when it comes to judging exploitative behavior by intellectual property rights holders with market power. For despite the oft-stated unwillingness to condemn exploitation under U.S. antitrust laws, and even despite the broad license given to intellectual property rights holders in General Electric, legal doctrine and enforcement policy in the U.S. is much more willing to rein in exploitative behavior by intellectual property rights holders than might otherwise be supposed.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the areas in which antitrust law (or competition law, as it is generally referred to outside the United States) constrains intellectual property rights holders from unduly exploiting their monopoly power when licensing or using their intellectual property rights. "Exploitation" is here used in the sense of "taking advantage" of downstream purchasers by extracting rents, either through higher prices or though the imposition of non-price terms (Akman 2009, O'Donoghue and Padilla 2006) . Some forms of exploitation might lead to exclusion, for example, where exploitative behavior raises rivals' costs or increases entry barriers, and thus the line between exploitation and exclusion is not always perfectly clear. Nevertheless, a critical distinction is the focus on harm to the immediate buyer (or licensee) without any necessary concern for ultimate effects on consumer welfare or deadweight welfare loss.
From a normative standpoint, this chapter argues that intervention to prevent this type of exploitation is consistent with sound competition policy. Preventing intellectual 4 property rights holders from undue exploitation of their rights is an important aspect of economizing on the reward that we give intellectual property rights holders to incentivize innovation. The argument over how much short-term monopoly loss we are willing to incur so as to get long-term innovation is a familiar one in the intellectual property literature (First 2007) . Although some argue, in effect, that "too much is not enough" (Scotchmer 1991) , antitrust tradition is on the side of placing some limits on monopoly profits and placing greater reliance on the incentives that competitive markets provide.
Many of the cases this chapter discusses are in that tradition.
This chapter focuses on three areas in which antitrust enforcers have intervened to prevent exploitation. The first involves patents subject to FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) licensing obligations (FRAND-committed patents 4 ), a major area in which courts and agencies have been willing to prevent excessive pricing. The second area involves disclosure requirements that can be imposed on patent holders to prevent the exploitation of licensees or potential licensees. The third is post-expiration royalties.
The chapter concludes with some observations about the emerging policy consensus regarding abusive licensing by patent holders with market power.
I. Excessive Pricing: FRAND Obligations
A. The General Problem FRAND licensing obligations have arisen in the context of the establishment of industry standards that allow interoperability among diverse products. These standards have been adopted through the efforts of private industry standard setting organizations 5 (SSOs) and have been particularly important in high technology industries, such as electronics and communications equipment, where common platforms are necessary if firms are to manufacture compatible but competing products.
SSOs have adopted FRAND obligations to solve a particular problem. Industry participants know that once a standard is chosen, firms will design products that incorporate the standard. If there are patents that are essential for utilizing the standard ("standard essential patents," or SEPs), firms that use the standard will be liable for royalties. When an SSO chooses a standard, it will, of course, give consideration to issues of technical superiority, but industry participants will also want to minimize royalty rates. The SSO could try to negotiate royalties in advance of adopting a standard, but the SSO is just a collective of buyers and its negotiations could be viewed as a buyer's cartel, raising the potential for antitrust liability. On the other hand, if implementers of the standard wait until they design products that need to use SEPs, they might be subject to opportunistic behavior from patent holders. Implementers will likely have made substantial investments in standards-compatible products and become effectively locked into the standard. Patent holders would then be able to hold up licensees for high royalties, not because of the intrinsic innovative value of the patent but because of the value of the investments that the potential licensee has made.
To solve this hold-up problem SSOs began requiring firms that owned patents reading on a proposed standard to agree to license those patents on RAND (or FRAND) 6 terms (FRAND and RAND are used interchangeably) (Crane 2010 Ethernet standard that allowed backward compatibility, had promised to license the patents covering the technology to any requesting party for a one-time fee of $1000. The relevant patents were later assigned to another company, and eventually to N-Data. The later assignees, although aware of the commitment, decided that the patents were worth more and set out to collect the higher royalties from a group of target companies that included many large computer hardware manufacturers. The royalties demanded represented a "substantial increase" over the original $1000 fee.
13
The FTC's complaint charged that N-Data's conduct was an "unfair method of competition" in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The "threatened or actual anticompetitive effects," the FTC asserted, included "increased royalties" for the manufacture or sale of products that implement the standard. 14 As the Commission 11 explained, even if N-Data's conduct did not violate the Sherman Act, the conduct "threatened to raise prices for an entire industry."
15
The Commission's concerns were not exclusively focused on price raising. These cases arose in the context of the standard setting process. The Commission emphasized that protecting the integrity of that process by bolstering assurances against hold-up was critical to innovation as an overall matter. It wasn't just that buyers (licensees and downstream consumers) should be free of excessively high prices. The Commission felt that industries that innovate around standards will be more innovative if royalties for implementing the standards are ex ante fairer and if participants keep their promises.
16
In neither of these cases, however, did the Commission focus on whether the patent holder had monopoly power in some well-defined market or whether it exercised that power in an exclusionary matter. No real attention was even paid to the extent that the practices restricted output or raised entry barriers. Rather, the Commission talked about exploitation. Patent holders, the Commission wrote, should not be allowed to "exploit the power [they] enjoy" over firms that "lack[] any practical alternatives" because they are locked into a standard.
17
What of the legal argument that the antitrust laws don't reach pure exploitation?
The legal answer is that the Commission felt that it was operating under a "stand-alone" Whether the courts would accept the Commission's legal approach to this type of conduct, however, is uncertain. Both cases were settled by consent and no court has recently been called on to review the Commission's approach to a stand-alone theory of Section 5. Indeed, the Commission continues to struggle with its own interpretation of its authority under Section 5, subsequently releasing a one-page statement that attempts to set out a general approach to the issue but that does not specifically address the question of exploitative pricing of FRAND-committed patents (or patents more generally). 18 (FTC 2015) . Whatever the legal uncertainties, however, the Commission continues to investigate abuses in licensing FRAND-committed patents. Reg. 57056 (Sept. 21, 2015) . Commissioner Olhausen, in dissent, noted the lack of specificity with regard to breach of standard-setting commitments, id. at 57058.
19 Qualcomm (2015) , reporting that the FTC notified it in 2014 that it is investigating Qualcomm's licensing practices, "including potential breach of FRAND commitments." InterDigital had a dominant position in each market because Huawei had no substitutes if it wanted to continue to produce mobile phones. Dominance thus established, the court found that InterDigital's rates were unreasonable-at least seven times higher than the rates it charged other licensees-a difference that was not cost-justified (Hou 2015a ).
The court imposed $3.2 million in damages and, in a companion case, set the royalty rate for InterDigital's SEPs at 0.019 percent of the sales price of Huawei's products, which 20 For similar developments in India, see Gandhi et al. 2015. 14 was not only lower than the original rate but apparently lower than what Huawei itself was charging licensees for its own handset patents (Chin 2015 , InterDigital 2016 .
21
On the government side, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is responsible for conduct involving price-related anticompetitive conduct, also investigated InterDigital's licensing practices. Following the High Court's 2013 decision in Huawei, however, the NDRC suspended its investigation, receiving commitments from InterDigital to lower its royalty rates for its portfolio of patents for 2G, 3G, and 4G wireless mobile technology (Chin 2015) .
More high-profile was the NDRC's investigation of Qualcomm and the settlement of that investigation in 2015. The NDRC found that the licensing of each of Qualcomm's SEPs constituted a relevant market and that the relevant market for the case was a "collection" of those markets. 22 As in the High Court decision in Huawei, the NDRC concluded that Qualcomm had a dominant position in its SEP markets. Each SEP is "indispensable and irreplaceable" for terminal equipment manufacturers, making these manufacturers "highly reliant on Qualcomm's patent portfolios," and firms with competing technologies are not able to enter the market with standards-compliant technology.
23
Having found dominance, the Commission then decided that Qualcomm abused its dominant position by charging "unfairly high royalties" in violation of Article 17 of 21 The parties have settled their disputes in every jurisdiction other than China, agreeing to binding arbitration (Chin 2015 40 Id. at 11. The legal grounds for the Commission's conclusion are different than the ones it asserted against Qualcomm, supra. For critical comment on the draft of the JFTC Guidelines, see Wright and Ginsburg (2015) . Korea fined Qualcomm more than $200 million, the largest fine it had ever imposed on a single company (Lee 2012 ).
The KFTC's case is a rare example of a competition enforcement agency focused on the "non-discriminatory" part of FRAND. The KFTC found that Qualcomm had charged discriminatory rates in three ways: (1) (Kim and Yang 2015) .
The Commission's case against Qualcomm's discrimination was thus bottomed on exclusionary effect in other markets in which Qualcomm was competing, and not on unfair pricing in the licensing of its patents. Nevertheless, the Commission also hinted that it might take the view that the decision of a SEP holder to renege on a commitment to FRAND rates might in itself raise competitive concerns (Kim and Yang 2015) .
Indeed, the KFTC continues to investigate Qualcomm's licensing of its SEPs, apparently now focusing on whether it is "unfair" for Qualcomm to base royalties on the price of a handset rather than using some other measure (Mu-hyun 2015) . 24 and peripheral devices. The Commission alleged that Dell, as a member of the SSO, had failed to disclose a pre-existing patent that the standard would infringe. After the standard was adopted, and after 1.4 million computers were sold with this technology, Dell informed computer manufacturers that their implementation of the standard infringed its patent. Dell threatened enforcement unless royalties were paid.
Dell eventually settled with the FTC, agreeing not to enforce its patent for ten years. The Commission's analysis of the effects of Dell's actions was brief. The Commission noted that Dell's collection of royalties "would likely" have increased prices to end-user consumers and that Dell violated Section 5 of the FTC Act because it was trying to "take advantage" of market power resulting from the standard rather simply getting royalties based on the "inherent value of the patent."
48 Put otherwise, Dell was unfairly trying to exploit the computer-maker licensees.
Three years after settling the Dell case the FTC filed a complaint against Intel for withholding proprietary technical information that it had previously furnished to three computer manufacturers, done in retaliation for their assertion of patent rights adverse to Intel and to force these customers to license their technology to Intel. 49 The FTC alleged that Intel had monopoly power in the general-purpose microprocessor market, that all three customers were highly dependent on Intel microprocessors, and that the proprietary information Intel withheld was important for enabling these customers to make computers compatible with Intel chips. Although the Commission framed its case as one 48 See id. at 624 n.2 (Statement of the Commission); 60 Fed. Reg. 57872 (Nov. 22, 1995) 
25
involving exclusionary conduct, "entrenching" Intel in its dominant position in the microprocessor market, none of these computer manufacturers competed with Intel in that market nor was it clear how Intel's behavior might have made it more difficult for competing microprocessor chip makers to succeed in the market.
What was actually critical to the Commission's complaint was that the three OEMs were highly-dependent customers, subject to Intel's "coercive business tactics."
50
The "[c]ontinued denial of advance technical information to an OEM by a dominant supplier can make a customer's very existence as an OEM untenable." 51 The only way to avoid this potential exclusionary impact was to accede to Intel's demands to give up their patent rights. In this way Intel had effectively raised the prices these customers were paying to Intel, extracting rents through the imposition of non-price terms. The
Commission was never put to the test of proving that Intel's coercive tactics violated Section 5, however, because the parties settled the case just before the start of the FTC's administrative hearing.
52
Intel was followed by two cases that returned to the problem of patent-holder deception of a standards-setting body. The complaints in the two cases were quite similar. In both the Commission alleged that the patent holder had failed to disclose the existence of its patents prior to the decision adopting the standard. Both cases also had similar allegations as to competitive harm. In each the Commission alleged that the respondents' conduct led to increased prices to licensees and, eventually, to increased prices to the purchasers of the licensees'
products. 55 Finally, in both cases the Commission charged the respondents not only with monopolization and attempted monopolization of the technology markets involved (that is, the licensing of their patents), but also with "unreasonably restrain [ing] Preventing the FRAND outcome was not "anticompetitive" because (as noted at the beginning of this chapter) the only harm from Rambus's deception would then have been higher prices. The Commission had therefore not met its burden of proving that Rambus's conduct caused harm to competition.
28
The decision in Rambus has been criticized on its facts ( (Lee 2012) . The possibility that a dominant firm could raise rates in the future on customers that lacked alternative supplies was enough to constitute unfair exploitation.
66
The difference between how post-expiration royalties are handled in the United
States and how they are handled in China and Korea offers three useful insights. First, handling this as a competition law matter rather than a matter of patent law interpretation allows for a more careful assessment of the economic impact of the practice. Taking the patent law approach, it does not matter whether the patent holder has monopoly power, either when the license is negotiated or when the patent expires; under a competition law approach, however, the market power of the licensor is critical because a violation depends on whether the licensor has a dominant position. Second, assuming that the prices post-expiration simply make up for lower prices during the patent term, with the parties choosing to spread the payments as a way to allocate risk. In other words, the net will be the same. 67 But in a FRAND setting, that will not be the case. The SEP holder's pricing is constrained in the patent period, for it has committed to pricing below a monopoly level. This means that there are unrealized monopoly profits to be had.
Getting them in the post-expiration period is one way to do it, effectively raising the net above FRAND rates and extracting rents from licensees beyond what the parties had considered fair.
IV. Conclusion
The goal of antitrust law is generally considered to be to promote competition (or at least to remove restraints that hinder competition). The goal is not generally thought to be to prevent exploitation. Yet the examples reviewed in this chapter show that courts and enforcement agencies, in the United States and around the world, have taken a different view when it comes to intellectual property rights exploitation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, antitrust law is being used today to control the ability of 67 See Schreiber, 293 F.3d at 1017 ("The duration of the patent fixes the limit of the patentee's power to extract royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a shorter period of time or a lower rate over a longer period of time.").
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intellectual property rights holders to exploit their licensees through excessively high prices or the imposition of particular non-price terms.
These decisions are most apparent in the area of FRAND licensing-by its terms, a restriction on the prices that the patent holder can charge-but they also occur outside the area of FRAND-committed patents when intellectual property rights holders use their monopoly power (or dominant position) to impose onerous terms on their licensees, whether through direct price-raising or through other terms that will effectively raise price. The critical insight from competition policy is that the ability to raise prices is not just a reflection of the existence of a patent-which does not, in itself, grant an economic monopoly-but from market power, assessed through conventional market analysis that considers substitutes for the technology involved and barriers that restrict the ability of competitors to enter and compete in that market. Outside of monopoly, patent holders are free to charge what the market will bear for their technology, just like other sellers.
The examples reviewed in this chapter also show that enforcers concerned about monopoly exploitation by intellectual property right holders have tended to look for some conduct in addition to the imposition of high prices. Enforcers have focused on the effort of SEP holders to bring infringement cases seeking injunctions or exclusion orders, or the deception of standards setting organizations or regulators that leads to high prices. This effort to look for specific conduct is true both for enforcers in the United States, constrained by the current view that Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not make monopoly prices illegal, and for enforcers outside the United States that operate without this legal constraint. The reason for this focus is not that these enforcers are concerned with deceit (the allegations of deceit are often quite thin) or think that litigation is a bad 34 thing. The reason is that it is administratively challenging to judge whether prices are sufficiently high as to be "excessive."
Competition agencies and courts may fear the administrability problem too much in the patents area. Litigants are often forced into court to determine damages in patent cases, which may involve determining what constitutes a reasonable royalty; FRAND rates are a particular subcategory of this type of litigation. In this patent litigation part of the effort in assessing a reasonable rate is to avoid overcompensating the patent holder so as to not discourage follow-on innovation (Lee and Melamed 2016) . If reasonable rates can be determined in the context of patent infringement litigation, in which overcompensation is a concern, why is it so much harder to figure out reasonable rates in the context of antitrust litigation?
Intellectual property rights that give their holders long-term monopoly power are particularly costly for society. Competition law intervention that can reduce this cost is warranted. This intervention is consistent with the rough judgment made through patent law's limited term that returns to innovation can be limited without destroying the "progress of Science and useful Arts." Preventing exploitation through high prices in the area of intellectual property rights can thus be a welcome departure from the general view that such conduct is not the province of competition law.
